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Private Sector Development in 
Xinjiang, China: A Comparison 
between Uyghur and Han
This paper focuses private sector participa-
tion and entrepreneurship in the Xinjiang 
Uyghur Autonomous Region (XUAR) in 
China’s far northwest, an area physically 
and culturally distinct from the economic 
boomtowns of the coast. Like other border 
areas of China, ethnic minorities make up a 
large portion of the population, 54% in Xin-
jiang compared to 8% in China as a whole 
[XSY, 2008]1. The Uyghurs, a Turkic Mus-
lim ethnic group numbering about 8 mil-
lion, primarily reside in Xinjiang’s poorer 
agricultural south in oasis settlements along 
the old Silk Road [Toops, 2004]. Econo-
mic reforms have been slow to reach rural 
southern Xinjiang, and even now Uyghurs 
primarily engage in agriculture outside the 
main urban areas. In contrast, Xinjiang’s 
Han Chinese-populated urban north has 
benefited from state investment as an in-
dustrial hub and the focal point for private 
sector activity in the region.
The private sector in Xinjiang, though small, 
has in recent years attracted growing num-
bers of entrepreneurs and workers into urban 
centres. Resources in XUAR are increasin-
gly allocated by the market rather than the 
state – an environment that, to ethnic mino-
rities, means advantages for Han who have 
greater access to jobs and self-employment 
opportunities due to their privileged urban 
position [Bovingdon, 2004]. Though ethnic 
groups such as the Uyghurs and Kazakhs 
have a long history of trade and mercanti-
lism [Roberts, 2004], most minority entre-
preneurs operate informally on the fringe 
of Xinjiang’s economic landscape. Rates 
of private sector participation and entrepre-
neurship in Xinjiang thus display significant 
ethnic difference. For Uyghurs, the focus of 
this paper, this issue has contributed to wor-
sening relations with Han, exacerbated by 
deadly riots in July and August 2009 [Sains-
bury 2009]. Thus, the growth and integration 
of Uyghur entrepreneurs into the urban pri-
vate sector forms a crucial step in maintai-
ning ethnic stability in the region.
This paper builds on earlier studies of mino-
rity entrepreneurship in Xinjiang that highli-
ght the growing importance of the private 
sector for the Uyghurs. Research undertaken 
by Dana (1998) focused primarily on border 
trade with Kazakhstan, while a later work 
by Vicziany and Zhang (2004, 2006) exa-
mined the relationship between Uyghur mi-
gration and entrepreneurship. Both studies 
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1 Figures calculated from the Xinjiang Statistical Yearbook, hereafter XSY.
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note the low levels of Uyghur participation 
in the private sector; however, there has been 
no attempt to investigate the regional varia-
tion of Xinjiang’s private sector growth and 
quantify Uyghur participation and entre- 
preneurship vis-à-vis the Han. This paper 
addresses this gap by investigating two re-
lated issues: private sector concentration in 
Xinjiang’s urban north and levels of parti-
cipation (defined as self-employment or 
employment in a private enterprise) and en-
trepreneurship (self-employment) between 
Uyghur and Han. It forms part of a larger 
empirical study that analyses the challenges 
facing new minority entrepreneurs in Xin-
jiang and their role in development.
I first describe the growing importance of the 
private sector in Xinjiang and the economic 
role of the state. I then note discrepancies 
between Xinjiang’s urban north and rural 
south in private sector development in rela-
tion to Han in-migration. I demonstrate that 
areas with a large Uyghur population have 
a less developed private sector than areas 
with a Han majority. I show how Uyghurs 
have increasingly engaged in private sector 
activity, though mostly in tertiary industries 
such as commerce and catering. I conclude 
by suggesting the need to foster urban mi-
nority enterprises to increase Uyghur parti-
cipation in the private sector and reduce the 
inter-ethnic gap.
ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT AND THE PRIVATE SECTOR IN XINJIANG
Xinjiang’s economy differs markedly from 
that of China’s coast, where the private 
sector accounts for over 70% of the na-
tional GDP [Engardio, 2005]. Like other 
western provinces in China, Xinjiang’s 
remote location has deterred foreign trade 
and investment – until the collapse of the 
Soviet Union, little trade filtered through 
Xinjiang’s 5,000 kilometre-long border. 
Rather, the central government relied on 
the Xinjiang Production and Construc-
tion Corps (XPCC; hereafter bingtuan), 
a demobilised branch of the People’s 
Liberation Army, to ‘reclaim’ land and es-
tablish large-scale farming [Toops, 2004, 
pp. 245-246; Seymour, 2000]. Xinjiang’s 
vast resources, strategic position along the 
Silk Road ‘energy corridor’ and someti-
mes-violent ethnic tensions have led the 
central government to retain a firm grip 
on the economy. Reform in border trade 
has aided private sector growth, but the 
economic structure of XUAR remains un-
balanced and is dominated by state and 
bingtuan ownership [Vicziany and Zhang, 
2004, pp. 2-5).
However, while the state maintains heavy 
control over Xinjiang’s economy, the num-
ber of producing units in the private sector 
has steadily increased in the last few years. 
The number of private enterprises (siying 
qiye: 8 or more employees) rose from 
3,251 to 5,099 from 2001 to 2004, and self- 
employed units (getihu: less than 8 em-
ployees) increased from 643,000 to 742,000 
in the same period [NBS, 2008, Table 5-16; 
NBS, 2002, Table 5-18; XESY, 2006, Table 
7-18]. The number of employed persons in 
siying qiye and getihu has also burgeoned 
with the establishment of new enterprises 
(Figure 1). Several large privately-owned 
enterprises from eastern China have re-
cently established branches in Xinjiang 
[Zhao, 2001, p. 218]. Local governments 
now actively encourage the development 
of Xinjiang’s small and medium enterpri-
ses through tax breaks, as well as provi-
ding preferential tax policies for foreign-
funded enterprises (Xinjiang Daily, 2008). 
In contrast, employment in the urban state 
sector has followed the national downward 
trend through enterprise restructuring and 
massive layoffs (over 600,000 from 1995 
to 2000) [Weimer, 2004, p. 179].
With declining employment in the state and 
collective sectors, the private sector will be 
expected to absorb surplus workers and mi-
grants in Xinjiang. Nonetheless, while the 
private sector in XUAR continues to grow, 
economic development has been concen-
trated in the industrialised, urban north at 
the expense of the rural south. In the next 
section, I show how uneven development 
has resulted in inequalities in private sector 
growth and participation between regions 
and ethnic groups.
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Figure 1. Change in employment by type of ownership, Xinjiang, 2000-2006
Source: China Statistical Yearbook (CSY) 2007 (NBS 2008: Tables 5-2, 5-13 and 5-14);
CSY 2006 (NBS 2007: Tables 5-4, 5-15 and 5-16);
CSY 2005 (NBS 2006: Tables 5-4, 5-18 and 5-19);
CSY 2004 (NBS 2005: Tables 5-4, 5-18 and 5-19);
CSY 2003 (NBS 2004: Tables 5-4, 5-17 and 5-18);
CSY 2002 (NBS 2003: Tables 5-4, 5-17 and 5-18);
CSY 2001 (NBS 2002: Tables 5-4, 5-17 and 5-18). 
Calculated by author.
UNEVEN REGIONAL DEVELOPMENT IN XINJIANG
In the PRC as a whole, selling agricultural 
surplus on the market, the beginnings of 
‘primitive accumulation’ [Webber, 2007] he-
ralded the start of a dynamic, ‘home-grown’ 
private sector of self-employed individuals. 
Today the penetration of foreign capital into 
China favours urban areas, leading to higher 
national rates of urban private sector em-
ployment. Yet unlike in the rest of China, 
farmers in Xinjiang remained more closely 
tied to the state and were often coerced into 
growing cash crops, particularly cotton. 
Only since 1999 have agricultural labourers 
in Xinjiang been able to sell excess cotton on 
the market [Chau, 2004, p. 259]. In contrast, 
cities have received the majority of invest-
ment [Zhao, 2001, p. 216]. Thus the rise of 
the private sector has followed urbanisation 
and industrialisation of Xinjiang’s cities as a 
predominantly urban phenomenon.
Table 1 illustrates the primacy of urban pri-
vate sector employment in Xinjiang. There 
are two main issues of note here. First, Xin-
jiang’s economy maintains a higher share of 
urban employment than the PRC as a whole, 
despite XUAR’s higher proportion of ru-
ral residents (in Xinjiang, 37.9% to 62.1%; 
in China, 43.9% to 56.1%) [NBS, 2008, 
Table 4-1; XSY, 2008, Table 4-1]2. Second, 
Xinjiang’s rural share of private and self-
employed individuals is much lower than in 
urban areas, and its percentage of self-em-
ployed individuals has actually decreased 
since 1995. This can be attributed partly to 
2 Weimer (2004, p. 177) writes that “in contrast to the 
rest of China, a relatively large share of Xinjiang’s po-
pulation resides in urban areas, 50 percent of the total 
versus 30 percent for China as a whole.” This conclu-
sion is based on pre-2000 census data taken from the 
Xinjiang Statistical Yearbook, which listed the urban 
and rural proportion in 1999 at 52.3% and 47.7%, res-
pectively [XSY, 2008, Table 4-1]. However, from 2000 
the yearbook notes that “the total urban and rural po-
pulation is calculated on the 5th national population 
censuses, data of population is calculated on the annals
of public security in other years” (ibid, Table 4-1). As 
other studies of Xinjiang evince gradual urbanisation 
since 1949 (see Ren and Yuan, 2003), we can conclude 
that a sharp decline in urban population is unlikely. As 
census data are generally more accurate in Xinjiang, 
revised ratios provide a better picture of overall pro-
portions. The most recent 2005 1% census sample gives 
ratios as urban = 24.4%, town = 12.8%, village = 62.8% 
(calculated by author) [Xinjiang Statistical Bureau, 
2007, Tables 1-1a, 1-1b and 1-1c].
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Table 1. Urban and rural employment, Xinjiang and PRC, 1995-2005 (in thousand persons) 
Source: Wiemer (2004, p. 178); CSY, 2001 [NBS, 2002, Table 5-4]; CSY, 2006 [NBS, 2007, Table 5-4].
Calculated by the author.
Note: Numbers in parentheses indicate percent of total; others indicate percent of urban/rural.
PRC figures are for sums across provinces.  Figures derived average about 10% less than the national total and 
30% for urban subtotal.  Wiemer (2004, p. 178) notes that this is due to a yearbook adjustment.
Percentages within rural sub-category represent employment shares exclusive of primary industries.
1995
 Xinjiang    Xinjiang     PRC     Xinjiang PRC
Total 6 622 6 725 629 789 7 643 680 274
(100%) (100%) (100%) (100%) (100%)
Urban Total 3 497 3 184 150 166 3 604 176 400
(52.8%) (47.3%) (23.8%) (47.2%) (25.9%)
     Private enterprise 68 171 12 679 586 34 584
1.9% 5.4% 8.4% 16.3% 19.6%
     Self-employed 270 409 21 361 571 27 777
7.7% 12.8% 14.2% 15.8% 15.7%
Rural Total 3 125 3 541 479 623 4 039 503 873
(47.2%) (52.7%) (76.2%) (52.8%) (74.1%)
     Private enterprise 23 52 11 387 85 23 656
0.7% 1.5% 2.4% 2.1% 4.7%
     Self-employed 216 198 29 339 188 21 228
6.9% 5.6% 6.1% 4.7% 4.2%




more rapid urbanisation since the reform pe-
riod and better opportunities in cities both in 
employment and in private business.
Most of Xinjiang’s urban areas, and by far 
its most industrialised, are located north of 
the Tian Shan (Heavenly Mountains) along 
the ‘northern economic belt’ stretching from 
Urumqi in the east to Karamay in the west 
(see Map 1). Cities here were originally esta-
blished as Qing garrison outposts, bingtuan 
settlements or as industrial centres during 
China’s interior modernisation program that 
served as conduits for state-sponsored mi-
gration and settlement [Toops, 2004]. They 
have since grown rapidly. Xinjiang’s nor-
thern economic belt accounted for nearly 
half of the Region’s total GDP in 2006 [XSY, 
2008, Table 2-10] and 90% of its heavy in-
dustry in 1995 [Zhao, 2001, p. 216]. Each 
has its designated industry: Karamay is a 
petrochemical centre, Kuitun is involved in 
energy production, and Changji serves as an 
industrial suburb to Urumqi. Road and rail 
transport link the entire economic belt to the 
hub at Urumqi, where goods can be loaded 
and shipped off to destinations in eastern 
China and further afield.
Smaller cities in Xinjiang’s south have ex-
perienced some urban development, but to 
a lesser degree owing to their poor infras-
tructure and vast distances from key markets 
[Zhao, 2001]. A railway line from Urumqi 
to Kashgar was only completed in 1999, 
while the Hotan spur is not to be servicea-
ble until 2010 [Zhou, 2008]. All of southern 
Xinjiang’s border crossings are closed for at 
least six months out of the year, prohibiting 
overland travel. Distance from inner China 
pre-empts large-scale investment from rea-
ching most of southern Xinjiang, though 
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Map 1. Prefectures, administrative districts and northern belt cities, Xinjiang
Note: Labels in bold refer to prefectures and administrative districts.  Other labels refer to northern belt cities.
Areas shaded black are administered by the bingtuan.
Ili Kazakh Autonomous Prefecture includes the subdivisions of Tacheng Prefecture and Altai Prefecture. 
the central government plans to invest hea-
vily in select southern cities [Zhao, 2001, 
pp. 216-217]. Economic restructuring in 
Xinjiang delegates agricultural production 
and oil extraction as the south’s primary 
activities; however, Tarim Basin oilfields 
continue to be unprofitable for Xinjiang’s 
residents and most southern inhabitants are 
involved in small-scale subsistence farming 
with little income [Becquelin, 2004].
Private sector development has followed 
government investment and infrastructure 
in the urban north and has grown rapidly. 
Maps 2-5 illustrate the density of producing 
units and employed persons in both private 
sector classifications (getihu and siying qiye) 
for 2004 in each Xinjiang prefecture and 
prefecture-level city. In both cases, southern 
Xinjiang displays less density of private sec-
tor activity than the north.
Nearly all northern prefectures and admi-
nistrative districts display greater density 
of getihu and siying qiye than those in the 
south, particularly the northern belt cities 
of Urumqi and Karamay and Changji Hui 
Autonomous Prefecture (hereafter AP). In 
the south, Aksu Prefecture exhibits a slight-
ly higher ratio of enterprises per thousand 
population than other southern districts, lar-
gely due to the presence the Ayal bingtuan 
unit [Toops, 2004, p. 258]. XPCC members 
are no longer guaranteed labour in Xinjiang 
and many choose to participate in the private 
sector [Wiemer, 2004, p. 178], which boosts 
the density of getihu and siying qiye in Aksu. 
Bayingolin AP also has much private activi-
ty as it includes Korla, a boomtown built on 
energy resources. Ili Kazakh AP in the north 
supports border ports and cooperative zo-
nes conducive to private trade [Zhao, 2001, 
p. 216]. In contrast, the southern districts of 
Kizilsu Kyrgyz, Kashgar and Hotan display 
extremely low densities of self-employed 
household units and private enterprises.
The critical issue is that not only have in-
dustrial development and investment been 
concentrated in Xinjiang’s urban north, but 
that the northern ‘economic belt’ and surroun-
ding industrial cities contain a large majority 
of Han residents. Many are migrants from 
eastern China, arriving since de-collectivisa-
tion and the establishment of the household 
responsibility system in 1978 that prompted 
a second ‘looser’ phase of Han migration 
into Xinjiang [Ren and Yuan, 2003, p. 96]. 
From 1953 to 2006 the Han population 
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Maps 2-5. Private sector producing units and employed persons by prefecture/district, Xinjiang, 2004 
 (figures are per thousand population)
Source: Xinjiang Economic Census Yearbook [XESY, 2006, Tables 1-9 and 7-18];
XSY, 2007 (2008, Tables 4-7 and 4-12); XSY, 2005 (2006, Tables 4-5 and 4-7).
Calculated by author.
Note: Getihu = less than 8 employees; siying qiye = 8 or more employees.
Note: Areas shaded black are administered by the bingtuan and not included in the analysis.
increased its share of Xinjiang’s total po-
pulation from to 6.1% to 39.6% [Toops, 
2004, p. 246; NBS, 2008, Table 4-7]. Thou-
gh many recent migrants are skilled, those 
lacking a household registration permit, or 
hukou, comprise Xinjiang’s ‘floating popu-
lation’ that reside in Xinjiang’s urban areas, 
particularly in the north [Solinger, 1995]. 
Bingtuan members are also overwhelmin-
gly Han at 88.8% of total membership [Sey-
mour, 2000]. At the same time, Xinjiang’s 
Uyghurs and ethnic minorities predominate 
in rural areas (Table 2) and in southern Xin-
jiang (Maps 6-7).
The majority of Uyghurs in Xinjiang in-
habit a series of oasis settlements and ru-
ral townships surrounding the southern 
Tarim Basin, primarily in the Kizilsu Kyr-
gyz, Kashgar and Hotan districts. Howe-
ver, substantial populations are present in 
the eastern towns of Turpan (Tulufan) and 
Qumul (Hami), both known for fruit pro-
duction, and the traditional centre of Gulja 
located in Ili Kazakh AP on the border 
with Kazakhstan. Xinjiang’s thirteen other 
recognised minority groups are also pre-
dominantly rural, and many (particularly 
Kazakhs) reside in the northern grasslands, 
mostly in Ili Kazakh AP [Benson and Svan-
berg, 1998]. In contrast, the Han population 
primarily resides in Xinjiang’s larger ‘nor-
thern belt’ cities and in other northern areas 
linked by rail to eastern China. One excep-
tion is Korla, located in the sparsely inhabi-
ted Bayingolin Mongol AP, which boasts a 
large Han population that significantly in-
creases the Han share in the prefecture [Ma, 
2003, p. 113]. When divided into north and 
south, Xinjiang thus displays considerable 
ethnic difference in population.
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Table 2. Urban and rural population shares, Xinjiang, 2004 (%) 
Source: Xinjiang 1% Population Census Sample 2005 (Xinjiang Statistical Bureau 2007: Tables 1-1a, 1-1b,
1-1c, 2-1, 2-1a, 2-1b and 2-1c). 
Calculated by author. 
City Town Village City Town Village
Han 43.1 15.2 41.7 70.4 47.1 26.5
Uyghur 10.4 10.1 79.5 20.0 36.8 59.5
Other Minorities 1.8 15.7 66.5 9.6 16.1 14.0





Maps 6-7. Ethnic shares by prefecture/district, Xinjiang, 2006
Source : XSY, 2007 (2008, Tables 4-7, 4-12, 21-2).
Note: Areas shaded black are administered by the bingtuan and not included in the analysis.
Bachman (2004) charges the central govern-
ment of ‘Han economic imperialism’ in Xin-
jiang and argues that the main beneficiaries 
of economic development are urban Han. 
‘Internal colonialism’ may not capture the 
dynamic of Han and urban-centric develo-
pment in Xinjiang [Sautman, 2000], but it 
does illuminate the economic inequalities 
between the north and south and therefore, 
Han and Uyghur. Statistical data comparing 
living standards of China’s minorities is 
unavailable in the PRC [Bovingdon, 2004, 
p. 40], but existing census figures demons-
trate that the Uyghur ‘traditional heartland’ 
in southern Xinjiang shows poorer economic 
growth, lower GDP per capita and less priva-
te sector development in than in the Han-po-
pulated north. Additionally, Wiemer (2004, 
p. 177) has constructed a regression equa-
tion that demonstrates that, when controlling 
for agriculture, every one-percent increase 
in Han population corresponds with an in-
crease in per capita GDP of 44¥. These figu-
res together suggest that Uyghurs are more 
economically disadvantaged and have less 
access to the private sector than Han.
GAUGING UYGHUR PRIVATE SECTOR PARTICIPATION AND ENTREPRE-
NEURSHIP
Regional disparity in economic development 
and in the density of privately-owned units 
seems to demonstrate ethnic divisions in pri-
vate sector participation. Several researchers 
note poor minority performance in the private 
sector in Xinjiang [Vicziany and Zhang, 2004; 
Wiemer, 2004]. Other studies conclude that 
Han retain easier access to jobs, education 
the private sector than Uyghurs due to their 
privileged urban position [Bovington, 2004]. 
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Indeed, the location of most Uyghurs in rural 
areas outside the main economic centres pre-
cludes them from private sector participation 
and entrepreneurship. While preferential poli-
cies have accounted for better Uyghur partici-
pation in higher-salaried staff-and-worker po-
sitions (zhigong) [Hopper, 2005, pp. 46-47], 
these policies are not extended to the private 
sector [Bovingdon, 2004, p. 37]. Accordin-
gly, Uyghurs experience difficulty in securing 
private sector employment, often because 
Han business owners prefer Han employees 
[Gilley, 2001]. Thus, we would expect both 
Uyghur private sector participation and entre-
preneurship to be low vis-à-vis the Han.
There is little statistical evidence to help 
determine Uyghur participation and entre-
preneurship in the private sector. However, 
comparisons of workforce shares between 
ethnic groups in different industries shed 
some light on the degree of Uyghur private 
sector participation. Table 3 gives shares 
between ethnic groups both for agriculture 
and for non-farm industries, taken from the 
2000 census ‘long form’ sample. Han exhi-
bit higher shares in all non-farm industries, 
particularly in manufacturing, resource ex-
traction and construction positions that of-
fer better remuneration (see Hopper, 2005, 
p. 42).
Table 3. Ethnic shares between groups by industry, Xinjiang, 2000 (%) 
Source: Xinjiang Population Census 2000 (2002, Table C2-1).
Data from long form. Calculated by author.
Note: Commercial services includes: ‘finance and insurance’ and ‘real estate’.  Social services includes: ‘social 
services’, ‘hygiene, sport and social welfare’ and ‘education, culture and art, radio, film and television’.  All other 
categories classified as other.
Other
Han Uyghur minorities
Total 41.4 45.6 13.0
Agriculture & primary industries 25.1 59.9 15.0
Non-farm industries 67.2 23.0 9.8
Extractive 75.9 14.4 9.8
Manufacturing 70.6 23.0 6.3
Construction 89.5 7.3 3.2
Transport/storage 72.3 18.2 9.4
Commerce/catering 66.9 23.2 9.9
Commercial services 77.6 13.1 9.3
Social services 56.4 30.2 13.4
Other 58.6 28.2 13.2
 
 
However, much of this disparity in seconda-
ry and tertiary sector employment between 
ethnic groups is due to the high percentage 
of the Uyghur population being employed 
in agriculture. Noticeable Uyghur shares 
of trade and catering services (23.2%) and 
manufacturing (23.0%) thus suggest some 
level of participation. When considering 
shares within ethnic groups, commerce/ca-
tering and manufacturing account for 7.8% 
of total Uyghur employment and, impor-
tantly, 40.1% of Uyghur non-farm employ-
ment [Xinjiang Population Census 2002, 
Table C2-1]. Thus, to obtain a better picture 
of Uyghur private sector participation wi-
thin the ethnic group, we should examine 
overall employment of the non-farm work-
force only. In Table 4, shares within ethnic 
groups are divided by the proportion of the 
ethnic group engaged in non-farm activi-
ties, demonstrating that Uyghurs outside 
agriculture migrate toward employment in 
other industries, particularly commerce.
When shares within groups for the non-
farm workforce only are examined, the 
percentage of Uyghurs engaged in com-
merce/catering and social services actually 
exceeds that of Han, while reaching simi-
lar levels in manufacturing and transport. 
Shares for other minorities experience a 
similar jump. Since a large proportion of 
Xinjiang’s private sector is skewed toward 
commerce and transport [see XESY, 2006, 
Tables 1-9 and 7-18], these figures suggest 
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that non-farm Uyghurs and other ethnic 
minorities may be inclined toward private 
sector participation.
The census data, however, cannot accura-
tely gauge Uyghur private sector participa-
tion, nor do they demonstrate the degree of 
Uyghur involvement in entrepreneurship. 
Fortunately, figures from a 1998 PRC stu-
dy of minorities in Xinjiang, compiled by 
Wiemer (2004, p. 180), show the density 
of getihu by ethnic group, a useful gauge 
of self-employment. As with industry sha-
res between ethnic groups in Table 4, the 
Uyghur population in Table 5 exhibits a 
lower density of getihu than the Han po-
pulation, suggesting that Uyghurs are less 
inclined toward self-employment than Han. 
However, if the number of getihu in non-
farm industries is divided by the proportion 
of the population in the non-farm workforce, 
the density of getihu for Uyghurs increases 
significantly to nearly double the ratio for 
the Han population (see Table 5). Not sur-
prisingly, the majority of self-employed 
Uyghurs are involved in commerce and ca-
tering, which validates the data in Table 4.
Table 4. Ethnic shares (non-farm workforce) within groups by industry, Xinjiang, 2000 (%)
Source: Xinjiang Population Census (2002, Table C2-1). Data from long form. Calculated by author.
Note: Categories grouped as in Table 3.
Other
Total Han Uyghur minorities
Agriculture & primary industries 61.4 37.3 80.6 70.9
Non-farm industries 38.6 62.7 19.4 29.1
of non-farm workforce, shares in:
Extractive 3.2 3.6 2.0 3.2
Manufacturing 19.4 20.4 19.5 12.5
Construction 8.3 11.0 2.6 2.7
Transport/storage 8.3 8.8 6.7 7.9
Commerce/catering 20.5 20.4 20.6 20.6
Commercial services 2.6 3.0 1.5 2.4
Social services 21.2 17.9 27.8 29.2




Table 5. Self-employment by ethnicity, Xinjiang, 1998 (in number of getihu per thousand  
 population) 
Source: Adapted from Wiemer (2004, p. 180). 
Note: Ratios divided by ethnic non-farm workforce proportions from Table 4.
Han Uyghur Han Uyghur
Overall 25.33 15.99 40.40 82.42
Agriculture 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Extractive 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.00
Manufacturing 2.79 2.02 4.45 10.41
Construction 0.07 0.06 0.11 0.31
Transport/Storage 2.39 0.82 3.81 4.23
Commerce/Catering 15.31 11.42 24.42 58.87
Social Services 4.27 1.51 6.81 7.78
Other 0.49 0.15 0.78 0.77












The self-employment trends illustrated in 
Table 5 suggest that low levels of Uyghur 
self-employment for the whole population 
are mainly due to participation in agriculture 
rather than an inability to conduct business. 
In fact, the non-farm Uyghur workforce 
shows a much greater density of commerce 
and catering getihu than Han, showing that 
Uyghur self-employment outside agriculture 
is actually twice as common as with Han, 
particularly in commerce and restaurant/ca-
tering industries.
Furthermore, the figures in Table 5 actually 
underestimate levels of Uyghur self-em-
ployment for at least two reasons. First, 
Xinjiang’s private sector has grown subs-
tantially in the last decade since the 1998 
getihu study was published, and Uyghur 
entrepreneurship has increased with it [see 
Vicziany and Zhang, 2004]. Second, much 
of Uyghur self-employed activity goes un-
counted in statistical data. Uyghurs who en-
gage in informal self-employment, usually 
by selling excess crops or handicrafts, may 
do so without reporting their activities to the 
local government office. This ‘informal’ pri-
vate sector is common in both the countrysi-
de and in cities where traders and petty en-
trepreneurs operate without a fixed location 
[Solinger, 1995]. Thus, small scale trade and 
craft production among Uyghurs may not be 
represented in the official data.
These official statistics and other studies of 
Xinjiang demonstrate that most Uyghur en-
trepreneurs in Xinjiang are engaged in trade 
and catering services (such as restaurants). 
Many traders rent stalls in regional and ur-
ban bazaars selling goods obtained from 
eastern China. Uyghur eateries abound in 
Xinjiang’s cities due to their ‘cultural mo-
nopoly’ on halal food services [Vicziany 
and Zhang, 2004]3. In addition, a significant 
number of Uyghur merchants have forged 
trade links with Central Asia, with whom 
they have a cultural and linguistic affiliation. 
Merchants may ‘sojourn’ in Kazakhstan or 
Uzbekistan for months at a time selling 
Chinese-made goods and then scour do-
mestic markets for more products [Roberts, 
2004]. Several merchants have grown qui-
te wealthy in this way [see Vicziany and 
Zhang, 2006, p. 58].
However, Uyghur merchants who have 
grown accustomed to skirting customs du-
ties on imports and exports have found in-
creasing scrutiny at the border in recent 
years [Roberts, 2004, pp. 221-224]. Many 
merchants now operate through approved 
channels or through urban-based import/
export agencies. In addition, Central Asian 
buyers who prefer to purchase goods in bulk 
now often head straight for factories in eas-
tern China or large-scale markets in Urumqi, 
rather than operating through Uyghur ‘mid-
dlemen’ [ibid, p.224]. Thus, while border 
trade remains lucrative for some Uyghur 
merchants, industries within the urban pri-
vate sector are growing in importance, and 
access to them is necessary for Uyghur busi-
ness development. 
CONCLUSION
3 Hui Muslims also own restaurants and eateries throu-
ghout Xinjiang, though Uyghurs rarely eat in Hui 
establishments.
This paper has described Uyghur private 
sector participation and entrepreneurship 
compared to Han. I have argued that while 
Xinjiang’s private sector has grown in im-
portance, self-employment and private enter-
prise are mostly limited to urban areas in the 
north. This affects Uyghur participation and 
entrepreneurship in the private sector, which 
is significantly lower than Han. However, 
I have demonstrated that Uyghurs outside 
agriculture are more inclined toward self-
employment than Han, particularly in trade 
and catering services. A survey of other re-
cent studies [Roberts, 2004; Vicziany and 
Zhang, 2004] has revealed that many Uyghur 
entrepreneurs are involved in informal or 
unregistered private sector activity, many as 
merchants along the Central Asian border. 
However, changing economic conditions 
in Xinjiang are boosting the importance of 
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urban entrepreneurship for Uyghurs. There 
is a need, then, to foster and encourage the 
development of urban Uyghur enterprises 
that will facilitate greater minority participa-
tion in the private sector.
In a previous study, Vicziany and Zhang 
(2004, p. 13) state that Xinjiang's unique po-
litical economy (prevalence of state-owned 
enterprises, the bingtuan, and central go-
vernment subsidization of the economy) 
make state support a key to successful en-
trepreneurship, and call for state funds in-
vested in inefficient bingtuan enterprises 
be redirected toward subsidies for minority 
entrepreneurs. Though this would be a wel-
come improvement, similar funding sche-
mes thought already to be in place have 
been poorly implemented and inaccessible 
for most Uyghurs. Thus, state efforts should 
focus on quality implementation of funding 
opportunities for enterprises as well as wor-
king toward restructuring finance channels 
through banking and microfinance programs 
[Park et al., 2001]. In addition, entrepre-
neurship training strategies similar to those 
in place in other inner provinces of China 
should be made more widely accessible to 
Uyghurs (see ADB 2008 for a description of 
these programs). These approaches should 
accompany the ongoing development of 
reforms tackling education, poverty and in-
frastructure to further promote indigenous 
entrepreneurship among Uyghur communi-
ties. Uyghur entrepreneurs can provide a va-
luable source of employment and income for 
the community, making them a vital com-
ponent in reducing economic disparity and 
improving ethnic relations in Xinjiang.
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